

A Social Capital In Contemporary Indonesia: Examining Faith-Inspired Civil Society and Democracy

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Abstract: As a national agenda for development, democracy needs to be developed and deepened by both the Indonesian state and society to achieve a just and prosperous country. Within this framework, faith-inspired civil society organizations are expected to promote equality before the law and observe humanistic, pluralistic and tolerant religious social life. This study employs the theory of Bourdieu's Habitus, Gellner's Typology of Social Organization and Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship. It also engages other sociological theories, namely the social capital theory of civic community from Putnam, Coleman, Uphof, and religion-state relations theory from Bolland, Menchik, and Hassan. This study is qualitative with a multidisciplinary approach derived from Sociology, Anthropology, Political Science, and History. Research findings suggest the following: (1) The imbalance of bonding and bridging social capital has tended to result in hegemonic relations among faith-inspired civil society that to some extent excludes equal participation of 'the others'; (2) The social capital of civil society organizations is highly nuanced and formed based on differences in religious and political orientations, which are the resultant interpretation and understanding of the Sacred texts and its religious culture; (3) Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia with moderate religious orientations (*wasatiyah*) have contributed positively to social capital that is persistent and consistent with

democracy, while Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and to a lesser extent Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (GMIM) with religious fundamentalist outlook tend to have an imbalanced social capital, which is resistant toward the so-called “Pancasila democracy”.

Keywords: Religion; social capital; faith-inspired civil society; community; social organizations; Indonesia.

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Introduction

Indonesia is a highly pluralistic nation both in terms of the population’s religious and ethnic affiliations. As a multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation, religious tolerance—namely the willingness of people to respect one another and accept the co-existence of adherents of other religions and sects—is an intrinsic value in Indonesian social life. Recognition of social-religious and ethnic plurality and tolerance therefore plays a central role in the consolidation of the so-called “Pancasila democracy” in Indonesia.

Within the context of Indonesia, the issue of tolerance has become an important issue in current trends, namely the emergence of religious intolerance. In certain circles, growing feelings of self-righteousness and considering other schools of religious thought as heretics and even infidels are on the rise. As a result, social norms and rules, which are the basis of a shared life, are less obeyed, and violence between religious groups has become more prevalent. This occurs not only between religions, such as the cases of religious violence that occurred in Poso (Central Sulawesi) or Ambon (Moluccas) or on a much smaller scale in Tanjung Balai (North Sumatra).¹ Rather, sociologically speaking, it mostly occurs at the

¹ The incident, which occurred on 29 July 2016, was triggered by a complaint of a Chinese woman named Meliana over the sound of the call to prayer from the

intra-religious level, as experienced by certain non-mainstream Islamic groups, such as the Ahmadiyah (West Java and Lombok), Shi'a in Madura, East Java and Salafiyah worshipers in West Nusa Tenggara, the closure of the Jama'ah Islamiyah mosque in West Sumatra, and many others. All these events signify the absence, or lack thereof, of tolerant collective social attitudes and behavior that guarantee peaceful co-existence among different religious and ethnic groups. Ironically, the religious people should be the collective agents who affirm mutual sympathy and respect among people.

The above socio-religious phenomena show the low appreciation of certain religious communities toward positive norms as well as the lack of efforts to revitalize humanistic and tolerant norms of religious social life. This phenomenon indicates that cultural and structural factors play a very important role, and therefore need to be studied and analyzed. Theoretically, it can be assumed that nuanced religious conflicts occur due to underdeveloped social capital of religious civil society.² In addition, structurally, the principles of good governance are not yet fully implemented.³

The above proposition can be further explained through the findings that show that some Indonesian people are still relatively intolerant. Regarding political life, for example, which is an important requirement for the creation of a democracy, Indonesian society can

mosque located in front of her house. Then the mosque management confirmed the complaint to Meliana, who at that time displayed her disappointment. It was reported that Meliana had apologized, but apparently the news had already spread through social media that she had harassed the mosque officials, resulting in a mob that damaged temples in the port city.

² In this study, citizenship social capital is adopted, modified and developed from the concept of civic culture. Citizenship social capital serves as the basis for civil society, that is, a society characterized by the full attitude and behavior of civilization (civility) such as active participation in social life and statehood, the existence of equality, solidarity, mutual trust, tolerance and active associational life for collective cooperation. See the normative vision of the Madani Society in *Nation Transformation toward Madani Society*, 13-19, by the National Reform Team Toward Civil Society; Also "the Civic Community" in Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 86-91.

³ The concept of good governance has a relational dimension because it is a set of relations between civil society and the government that practices to maximize the common good. Some of the characteristics that must be upheld include: transparency, effectiveness, responsiveness, openness, submission to the rule of law, acceptance of diversity (pluralism) and accountability.

be categorized as less tolerant. A national survey showed that the majority of Indonesians (67%) expressed hatred, and were therefore unwilling to coexist with other socio-political and religious groups such as Jews (7%) and Christians (3%). Specifically, for Christians, members of the community allow worship services in the area around the respondent's residence (31%), and if in the neighborhood a church (40%) were to be established.⁴

Likewise, a similar picture occurs regarding mutual trust among citizens (or interpersonal trust), a political culture of society that can have a positive impact, or vice versa, for the creation of democracy in Indonesia. In this case, the political culture of the Indonesian people is not very supportive. Only 29% said they always or often have confidence in others. In general, members of society tend to be vigilant of others, and cannot easily build trust (86%). This percentage is high, and shows the low political culture for good governance.⁵

This paper delves into the levels and dimensions of the faith-inspired civil society's social capital that is persistent or resistant to democracy. The civil society organizations include Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Christian Gospel Church of Minahasa or Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (GMIM), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI), Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia (Pertu), Buddha Dharma, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defenders Front. Muhammadiyah and Persis are mainstream representations of Islam with a modernist orientation and moderate political attitude. On the other hand, NU and Persatuan Tarbiyah are traditional Islamic social organizations and tend to have moderate political attitudes. Meanwhile, HTI is considered a radical and fundamentalist organization that advocates the Caliphate and rejects democracy. The FPI is also considered 'radical' because the organization in the past had carried out 'sweeping', acting violently against immoral places.⁶ In fact, in terms of religious understanding, this group identifies itself as *Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* and adopts a moderate Syafi'i juridical school of thought like NU.

⁴ Saiful Mujani, *Islam dan Good Government* (Jakarta: PPIM, 2002), 19-20.


⁵ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

⁶ FPI has no longer carried out violent actions, since the beginning of the 2019, and now is advocating philanthropic action and *shalawatan* (religious gathering in praise of the Prophet Muhammad).

Social Capital of Faith-Inspired Civil Society

The social capital of faith-inspired civil society⁷ includes the following elements: 1) Reciprocal Trust, namely thinking, acting, and acting positively towards fellow citizens; 2) Solidarity is mutual feelings, interests, and goals with fellow citizens; 3) Tolerance is a willingness to tolerate differences of opinion, beliefs, and behavior habits; 4) Equality appreciates equality among fellow citizens and equal access to sources of life (such as the social, cultural, and political economy); 5) Social Networks: and Organizations (Associations), namely forums or organizations that serve as media for social relations; and 6) Participation (Civic Engagement) and Cooperation, namely the participation of a person in his community and conducting collective cooperation to achieve the common good and recognize diverse ethnic interests, as can be seen in the following Figure:

Figure 1: Elements of Social Capital



⁷ In this study, faith-inspired civil society and religious civil society are interchangeable. concept. Further, the social capital of religious civil society organizations is adopted, modified, and developed from the concept of civic culture. The social capital of religious civil society could be the basis of democracy, that is, a society characterized by the full attitude and behavior of civilization (civility) of civil society such as active participation in social life and statehood, the existence of equality, solidarity, mutual trust, tolerance and active in the association for collective cooperation. See the normative vision of Madani society in Nation Transformation towards Madani Society, 13-19, by the National Reform Team Towards Civil Society; Also “the Civic Community” in Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 86-91.

The eight elements of citizenship social capital will be seen among religious civil society organizations in West Sumatera, Yogyakarta, Bali, and North Sulawesi. The assumption is that the level of citizenship social capital within civil society organizations is based on the understanding of the values that originate in the text and their perceptions of the context of socio, cultural, political, and economic configurations. Understanding the text and the configuration of the context can be both a motivating and inhibiting factor for the development of citizenship social capital. The level of citizenship and social capital will in turn affect the formation of a multicultural democratic society. If the culture of citizenship is good, it will grow well with a multicultural democratic society, and vice versa.

Empirically, the social capital of citizenship can be grown among religious social life. This relates to what Bourdieu calls habitus. Habitus is a mental or cognitive structure, which is used by actors to deal with social life.⁸ Habitus is a product of history, as a legacy from the past influenced by the existing structure.⁹ Certain individual habits are obtained through life experiences that are internalized, for then they used to feel, understand, realize, and value the social world.¹⁰

This habitus of civilized life was also promoted by religious leaders including the Prophet Muhammad in the Medina community. Historical facts show that the social capital of faith-inspired civil society organizations can grow well in a society led by the Prophet Muhammad at the beginning of Islam and is now referred to as an ideal form of society. The Prophet of Islam had established the Muslim habitus which in the Nurcholish Madjid statement was “*Genuine engagement of diversities within the bonds of civility*”.¹¹ Even the ideas and practices of democracy at the time of the Prophet were considered to be very advanced beyond the development of his era. At that time, differences in religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity were actually used as social capital for the development of the community in sustaining state capacity which was directly led by the Prophet. It is this modern way of managing a state led by the Prophet Muhammad that Ernest Gellner, a well-known sociologist,

⁸ George Ritzer and Douglas J. Goodman, *Modern Sociological Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 522.

⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (California: Stanford University Press, 1990), 54.

¹⁰ Ritzer and Goodman, *Modern*, 2003: 522.

¹¹ See Nurcholish Madjid in *Republika*, 10 August 1999.

later said that Islam can maintain its system of faith in the modern age without doctrinal interference.¹² This is because according to him, purification of the *aqidah* (basic tenets) can go hand in hand with the process of modernization. This compatibility is due to the pure teaching of Islam which is egalitarian (affirming the equality of humanity) and promotes science and research. This was also suggested by Marshall G.S Hodson (1974), an historian of Islam, that the XVI century innovative investment in humanity and material which was a transmutation factor of the modern technological age in the Western world was in fact already owned by medieval Muslim communities

According to Hikam, communities with solid social capital as seen in civil society are marked by free communication transactions by communities, because in this arena independent actions and reflections are ensured, not constrained by conditions of official political institutions.¹³ So here it is possible for negotiations to attain the common good while still obeying the applicable law, as a par excellence characteristic of civil society. There are at least three important elements that determine the strengthening of civil society, namely the existence of networks of social relations, reciprocal trust, and the willingness to reciprocate. Putnam's study in Italy, as reported in his seminal book *Making Democracy Work*,¹⁴ for example, have tried to prove that economic progress and social welfare in a given area are dependent on how far members of society have an awareness of the importance of engaging in a network of institutional relationships to achieve shared goals. The northern Italian region in general, according to Putnam, achieved a high level of social and economic success because most members of the community have long had a tradition to be involved in a wide network of social relations, so various social, political, and economic problems were solved successfully through institutional collaboration. In contrast, in southern Italy, there was no such tradition. Communities live in groups that run individually, separated from one another, and compete unfairly. This condition was concluded by Putnam as the most decisive cause of why this

¹² Ernest Gellner, *Membangun Masyarakat Sipil: Prasyarat Menuju Kebebasan*, translation by Ilyas Hasan (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), 3.

¹³ Muhammad A.S. Hikam, *Demokrasi dan Civil Society* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996), 3.

¹⁴ Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 1993a.

region could not achieve economic progress in multicultural democracy as happened in northern Italy.

As to the condition of Indonesia, Hefner points to the existence of a strong tradition among Muslims to associate.¹⁵ He specifically mentioned Muhammadiyah and NU as two large and well-established organizations where Muslims practiced associational culture, had shown the face of a peaceful Islam and played a role in promoting plurality and democracy in this country. In relation to the social capital of civil society, he said, "... the pluralist civic wing of the Muslim community believes that only through decisive rejection of Islamic politics (in the sense of formal political parties) and commitment to a pluralistic, democratic, and civil Indonesia, the nation can go forward".¹⁶

Thus, differentiation of religion and state is an important factor to nurture the social capital of civil society that is persistent in democracy. A study by Riaz Hassan shows that the pattern of differentiation that distinguishes religion and politics (in the case of Indonesia) shows that the trust among citizens is relatively higher than that of integration (the case of Pakistan).¹⁷ Similarly, it is also argued by Boland, as a "Pancasila State with a Ministry of Religion," Indonesia chose a middle way between "the way of Turkey" and the founding of an "Islamic State". A "secular state" would perhaps not suit the Indonesian situation; an "Islamic State", as attempted elsewhere, would indeed tend "to create rather than to solve problems". For this reason, the Indonesian experiment deserves a positive evaluation, according to Boland.¹⁸ Menchik, another expert, also argues a similar notion. According to him, in this divine nationalist Indonesia (Indonesia's godly nationalists), the presence of religious organizations in the public sphere is very beneficial for the public good (public good), rather than the secular-liberal concept that

¹⁵ Robert W. Hefner, *Islam Pasar Keadilan: Artikulasi Lokal, Kapitalisme, dan Demokrasi* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 227.

¹⁷ Riaz Hassan, *Keragaman Iman: Studi Komparatif Masyarakat Muslim* (translation) (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Press, 2006).

¹⁸ B.J. Bolland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 112.

the presence of religion in the public sphere is a threat to freedom and modernization.¹⁹

Meanwhile, in an effort to conduct empirical analysis and the basis for creating categories can be seen in Table 1 below. In this table, the beliefs, norms, and values commonly derived from religious teachings are a cultural aspect of social capital conception that has come to the attention of social scientists. Citizenship social capital is a cultural domain related to social organizations that dynamically determine relationships horizontally and vertically. The growth of reciprocal trust, solidarity, willingness to help and cooperation is a sign of the existence of social capital.²⁰

Table 1:
Category of Social Capital

Category	Structural	Cultural
Manifestation	Roles and Rules, Network and personal relationship, procedure and precedent	Norms, Values, Attitudes, Tenets
Domain	Social Organization	Element of Social Capital of Civil Society: Trust, Solidarity, Tolerance, Equality, Network, Association, Participation, and Cooperation.
Dynamic Factors	Horizontal Relationship Vertical Relationship	Trust, Solidarity, Cooperation, Generosity
General Elements	Expectation to cooperate, beneficial for all	

Sources: Uphoff (2000) dan Putnam (1994)

Findings regarding this matter can be elaborated as follows. According to research results, in the United States, the church acts as

¹⁹ Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

²⁰ Norman Uphoff, "Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation" (Paper in Staff Seminar, Mansholt Institute, Wageningen, 13 September 2000).

a social network that encourages community volunteerism: religious organizations encourage opportunities to serve, both inside and outside the scope of their groups, providing personal contacts, committees, telephone numbers, meeting rooms, transportation and whatever makes good intentions become real actions.²¹ Previous research also noted that religious volunteers are more motivated than those who are not religious in terms of their involvement in achieving the common good.²² Wuthnow also showed that church members were more eager to give money and time, including secular actions.²³ For example, they give 50 trillion every year as donations; this amount is three times greater than the money donated for education or five times greater than for health.²⁴ In terms of political involvement, church members were more likely to vote in elections,²⁵ and successful efforts to build residential settlements were more indicated by religious institutions or by devout people.²⁶ Other findings also show that religious institutions play an extraordinary role in developing one's ability as citizens (i.e. civic skills).²⁷

Furthermore, Putnam's conception of the two sides of the equilibrium seems to be relevant. He conceptualizes the existence of two circles, namely virtuous circles and vicious circles. The circle of virtue is one side of social equilibrium characterized by high cooperation, mutual trust, reciprocity, and civic engagement for the common good. This condition can be said to be the persistence of citizenship social capital. While the vicious circle (negative) is characterized by betrayal, distrust, denial, exploitation, chaos,

²¹ Robert Wuthnow, *God and Mammon in America* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 242.

²² Robert Wuthnow, *Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 325.

²³ Robert Wuthnow, "The Religion Industry: Further Thoughts on Producing the Sacred," in *Society for the Scientific Study of Religion Annual Meeting* (Nashville: Tennessee, 1996), 87.

²⁴ Robert Wuthnow, "Can Religion Revitalize Civil Society? An Institutional Perspective," in Corwin E. Smidt (ed.), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2003), 208.

²⁵ Kellstedt Wald, L. Kellstedt, and D. Legee, "Civic Involvement and Political Behavior," in D. Legee and D. Kellstedt (eds.), *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 49.

²⁶ John A. Coleman, "Religious Social Capital: Its Nature, Social Location, and Limits," in Corwin E. Smidt (ed.), *Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good* (Texas: Baylor University Press, 2003), 34.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

isolation, and setback. These elements reinforce one another and give birth to resistance to citizenship social capital. It can be said that collective cooperation between various Islamic and religious communities, in general, will be more prevalent in societies that are colored by the positive equilibrium side. Putnam's conception indicates that citizenship social capital will develop if equality before the law is enforced, the functioning of social norms, the establishment of cooperation, mutual trust, the running of reciprocity, and the active involvement of each Islamic group to obtain their rights as citizens in the framework of achieving the common good. This conceptual framework from Putnam is useful for the study of functional relationship of citizenship and social capital of Islamic social organizations with Pancasila multicultural democracy.

Members of civil society organizations are actually citizens. Thus, there is a need for some kind of citizenship mindset among persons who are actively involved in the organization. As far as the concept of citizenship is concerned, Marshall's theory suggests three dimensions of rights contained therein, namely civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights relate to basic issues such as freedom of speech and the right to obtain access and fair treatment in the legal system. Political rights are not only about the rights in elections but also greater access to political institutions to articulate their interests. Whereas social rights are related to access to a social security system, where every citizen has the right to obtain at least a basic level of welfare which must be fulfilled by the state in a state of unemployment, illness, or misfortune. However, it should be immediately added here that there are cultural rights, namely rights relating to cultural identity, religion, language, and customs, which are absent in Marshall's theory because of the relatively homogeneous context of British society in terms of religion at that time. According to Turner, active citizenship is a must to achieve these rights.²⁸

Furthermore, the link between the social capital of civil society and democratization is inspired by multicultural democratic theory. This theory initially questioned whether minorities have the right to maintain their cultural institutions and can legally maintain their

²⁸ Bryan S. Turner, "An Outline of a Theory of Citizenship," in *Sociology* 24, no. 3 (1990), 89-217.

cultural identity.²⁹ This theory discusses social, civil, and political rights, in addition to the accommodation rights of the institutional structure of the state for minorities. This multicultural democracy theory further states that there is a positive correlation or significant relationship between political integration with mutual trust, tolerance, and solidarity. Empirically, there is a positive correlation between social-political participation and mutual trust in politics (political trust) on the one hand and the presence of a network of community organizations on the other.³⁰

Faith-Inspired Civil Society and Public Religion

The development of religious civil society in West Sumatera, which is largely based on Islam shows a dynamic movement in social-cultural as well as social-political affairs, especially in the political years related to general, regional, and presidential elections. It appears that the civil society organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Tarbiyah, and Nahdlatul Ulama have become a bridge for Islam as a public religion.³¹ These religious civil societies watch closely every single public policy delivered by the central government, especially local government that have a direct impact on everyday life including regulations on zakat, Islamic clothing among female high school students, the eradication of prostitution and immoral actions.

In Yogyakarta, a notable political scientist Purwo Santoso of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) and local leader of NU said, “The state-society relations that we know of, has now somewhat transformed. It is no longer dictated by zero-sum games. Many civil society organizations, including NU and Muhammadiyah, have penetrated the state, and taken up positions of power.”³² This no doubt creates the conducive environment for the state to be

²⁹ C.M. Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton University Press, 1990); Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Right?” in *Political Theory* 20, no. 1 (1992), 105-139; Will Kymlicka dan W. Norman (eds), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

³⁰ Meindert Fenemo and Jean Tillie, “Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25, no. 4 (1999), 703-726.

³¹ Interviews with Muhammadiyah activist, Murisal, on 11 May 2022; Perti senior activist, Somad, on 11 May 2022 and NU activist, Syarifuddin, on 13 May 2022.

³² Interview with Santoso on 24 May 2022.

infiltrated by the interests and policy preferences of faith-inspired civil society.

The similar phenomenon also occurred in North Sulawesi, where the Christian Gospel Church of GMIM (Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa) is so dominant in the socio-political context of North Sulawesi and Manado as its capital city. GMIM is a civil society that determines who can become governors or mayors and regents in the North Sulawesi region, especially the Minahasa lands, which are predominantly Christian³³. In other words, while Christianity has become a public religion in North Sulawesi, Islam has become one in the context of West Sumatra.

It is said to be a public religion because these faith-inspired civil society organizations are not only active in religious movements that have the dimensions of *da'wab* or propagation but are also public, socio-cultural, socio-political, and economic dimensions. For Islamic organizations, their religion commands them to carry out movements that are multidimensional in nature. They also do not accept secularism because it is regarded as not neutral to religious positions, but in many cases, hostile. They are not only active in religious rituals and ceremonial matters but also in social movements that can improve the dimensions of wider community life so that it is more in line with the values of religious teachings, including in state and national life in accordance with the ideals of a good state and at the same time God blesses it (*baladah tayyibah wa rabb ghafur*) or who upholds good governance or makes God's Kingdom on earth for Christians.

Meanwhile, in Buleleng, Bali PHDI (Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia), the highest assembly of Hindus in Indonesia, established 1959 in Bali has a dominant position in various public policies.³⁴ Several elections are indeed under political parties, but the dominant members of certain political parties are Balinese Hindus so that is why the Hindu representation remains an important player in the decision-making process.

The dominance of certain civil societies in the public appears to be related to the dimensions and levels of social capital. When bonding social capital within civil society is strong but not balanced

³³ Interview with Manupiring on 10 June 2022.

³⁴ See I Ketut Ardhana et. al., *Towards Modern Hinduism in Bali: A Brief History of Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia* (Denpasar: Pustaka Larasan, 2019).

with bridging social capital between civil society, in this condition, bridging social capital can be improved by having cross-cutting affiliations. In both locations, there is the Inter-Religious Communication Forum (FKUB) and in the case of North Sulawesi, there is the Inter-Religious Cooperation Agency (Badan Kerjasama Antar Umat Beragama), considered as local wisdom. However, because the condition of the level of bonding and bridging social capital does not reach the equilibrium point, what transpires is a hegemonic relationship. This phenomenon of hegemony occurred both in West Sumatra and Yogyakarta by the Muslim civil society and in North Sulawesi by its Christian counterparts. This condition seems to point to some resistance against democracy or at least some reservations toward it.

In Buleleng, Bali the issue of bonding social capital is similar to that of West Sumatra and North Sulawesi. However, in terms of bridging social capital, there is a slight difference in which Buleleng Bali has a strong relation among different religious affiliations. FKUB is a case in point, showing the strong relationship among the members of this organization, ranging from Hindu, Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and Confucianist followers.³⁵ Balinese people with the teachings of *tat twam asi* are used as the basis for *menyama braya*. Other ethnic people are like brothers. In addition, Buleleng is already egalitarian compared to other areas in Bali.

As far as the relationship between faith-inspired civil society and the state is concerned, there are at least four positions: integration, substantive relation, differentiation, and secularization. HTI, FPI, and GMIM look to the position of integration between religion and state or faith and politics. Substantial relations seem to be proposed by NU and Muhammadiyah, which do not want a formal form of an Islamic state but advocate for Islamic values, which serve as guidelines in the management of the state, such as belief in God, social justice, and deliberation. While the differentiation is proposed by the Tarbiyah Islamiyah Association. This type of civil society clearly distinguishes between religion and the state as well as faith and politics. For example, this mass organization considers politics inappropriate to be discussed in the mosque. They consider that any struggle or fight to actualize certain values requires to be done through political parties.

³⁵ FGD with FKUB members on 23 and 24 May 2022.

While secularism distinguishes between the scope of religion and the state, faith-inspired civil society expects religious teachings to animate the life of the state. Therefore, Islamic organizations in Padang support Islamic values to be included in government policies in the form of bylaws. They are indeed not concerned with the labeling of sharia regulations but are more concerned with regulations in a more substantial form that accommodate the aspirations of the people who are heavily influenced by the culture of “*Adat basandi Syara, Syara basandi Kitabullah*” (Customs based on the Sharia, the Sharia based on Sacred Text of God). The internalization of Islamic symbols and values is indeed relatively intense in the education process and the life of a Minangkabau. The tradition of living in the *surau* (small traditional prayer house) since childhood for men really familiarizes them with the educational process, which is close to learning and reciting the Koran from childhood to adulthood.

Political figures who were later trusted to become governors, mayors, and regents also became a reflection of the religious nature of the people who were religious. A large number of votes for the Prosperous Justice Party at the provincial and city, and district levels show the Islamic political identity of the Minangkabau community. Indeed, the Gerindra party's vote is very large and is relatively the same number as the electoral vote and seats in the council. However, this is also inseparable from the role of the ulama's support for the Gerindra party presidential candidate, Prabowo, who at that time had full support from local clerics who at that time contested with Jokowi. Likewise, with the Manado case, where those elected as governors, mayors, and regents are people who have the blessing or support of GMIM and come from or have the support of the Indonesian Democratic Party, which in its formation is a fusion of nationalist and Christian parties.

However, the Minangkabau and Minahasa people still fully support the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila. Indeed, there are Islamic mass organizations that are really fighting for the formalization of Islamic law and want to establish an Islamic state in the Minangkabau region, such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council and HTI. Unfortunately, support for these organizations remains rather insignificant and overwhelmingly low numbers.

Islamic organizations in Padang and also reflected in the level of the province of West Sumatra, are moderate organizations in religious orientation. The strength of NU and Muhammadiyah with their moderate (*wasatiyah*) Islam in this region has contributed to the development of a culture of moderate religious understanding and democratic culture that is persistent with multicultural democracy based on Pancasila. Mutual trust, solidarity, and tolerance among fellow nations are reflected in the real lives of citizens. Here stands majestically in the middle of the city places of worship and also a means of education of religions other than Islam. Similar phenomena also occurred in Sulawesi where religious facilities were available for all religions. Equality among citizens is felt by all religious adherents. This cohesive and cooperative attitude in these two areas are contrary to other areas which are characterized by the persecution of minority groups. Equality is also felt by all citizens of different religions. Unfortunately, the equal position is not realized in representation in government institutions such as offices and regional power such as the sub-district head. Representation seems unequal because it is fully controlled by the religious majority of the population. This condition indicates that identity politics based on Islam and Christianity still influence politics in both regions, West Sumatra and North Sulawesi.

The political dynamics in Yogyakarta are again unique, as the province holds a Special Status, where its Sultan is by default the appointed Governor. While the Sultan/Governor tries to be neutral and become a leader for all his people, the role of Muhammadiyah and NU in his decision-making are no doubt significant. However, this does not mean that other groups such as the Catholics and Christians are weak. They are also almost equally strong and assertive in their own right.

However, social conflicts due to inequality in representation can be avoided due to the existence of a strong network of moderate groups. This network among moderate groups can be an antidote to social conflicts with religious nuances. Democratic participation and cooperation between the groups are not only on the socio-cultural side but also on the political and economic side. In short, faith-inspired organizations still contribute immensely—for better or worse—to the strengthening of democracy in these two regions.

On top of these, tolerance is one of the important elements of social capital. In Buleleng, Bali, tolerance is clearly existent in many

different forms, notably with the existence of “Pura Pancasila”. Pura Negara Gambur Anglayang or so-called Pura Pancasila is one of the oldest temples in North Bali representing multicultural society. The most notable thing about this temple is that it has eight *pelinggih* (shrines) constituting of Ratu Bagus Sundawan from Sundanese, Ratu Bagus Melayu from Malay element, Ratu Ayu Syahbandar, Ratu Manik Mas from Chinese or Buddhism, Ratu Pasek, Dewi Sri, Ratu Gede Siwa representing Hinduism, and Ratu Gede Dalem Mekah representing Muslims. Many different people from different religious and cultural backgrounds when they visit this temple become one, regardless of their backgrounds. Indeed, this is a kind of learning process in democratization in Buleleng. One *Pedande* (Hindu Balinese priest) told us:

The visitors to this temple are not only Hindus, but also those who are Muslims from different areas, like West Java, and other areas of Java. Elite people from political parties often visit the temple as well. For example, DP from PDIP visited this temple in 2022.

Another symbol of tolerance in Buleleng is the existing mosque, Hindu temple, and *klenteng* (Pagoda) in one neighborhood, near the seaport of Buleleng. People with the different religions usually have mutual respect and assistance in many ways. For example, during a silent day (*nyepi*) the Muslims will not use loudspeakers in the mosque during the call to prayers or *adzan*. During Islamic rituals, the Hindus will assist his or her Muslim friend to look after and visit the Muslim neighbors. The Muslims are free to have Ramadan market that sell many traditional foods for breaking of the fast. Based on our observation, one could see the sign of Ramadan market hanging in the *kampung* (village) gate even as Ramadan had already passed during our fieldwork. In a similar vein, Maunati and Ardhana also report the harmonious life among people with different religious backgrounds in Bali.³⁶ For example, In Tanjung Benoa during the Silent Day (*Hari Raya Nyepi*) for Hindus, the traditional security (*pecalang*) was appointed from among Muslim people to give the opportunity for the Hindus to perform their silent day in the proper manner, without any

³⁶ Yekti Maunati and I Ketut Ardhana, “Nation-state Building Process in a Multicultural Indonesia: Searching for Harmony” Paper presented in 21th *IFSSO General International Conference* on “The Ways and Means of Living in Peace and Harmony in Multicultural World” in Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey, 27-28 March 2013.

disturbance. Similarly, the *pecalang* looked after the situation when Muslim people perform *takbiran* of Islamic ritual, added by the Reog dance which originates from East Java. Indeed, we could observe living in harmony in Bali.

Based on the data and information gathered, this article is able to come up with a figure that could explain the relations between the state and faith-inspired civil society. Figure 2, entitled “State-Faith-Inspired Civil Society Relations”, reflects the positions of the various faith-inspired civil society in terms of their “bridging”, “linking” and “bonding” scheme within the context of state-society relations.

Meanwhile, Figure 3 shows the “Political and Religious Orientations of Faith-based Groups”, which in it include the faith-inspired civil society organizations that were examined in this study. It shows the political and religious orientations of the different faith-based groups. For the “political orientation”, the groups were divided into “conservative-radical”, while the “religious orientation” category was split into “moderate conservative” and “reformist/radical”.

Thus, the overall findings of this study show that: (1) the social capital of civil society seems to be imbalanced between the high bonding social capital within the organization and low bridging social capital between the organizations leading to hegemonic relations among religious civil society in the two areas, where Islamic civil society organization hegemon socio-cultural and to lesser extent political relations in West Sumatera, North Sulawesi, Yogyakarta, Hinduism civil society organizations in the context of Buleleng Bali, Christian civil society organization in North Sulawesi; (2) The social capital type of religious civil society organizations is formed due to differences in religious and political orientation which are the resultant understanding of the texts and their religious culture; (3) Muhammadiyah, NU, Persatuan Tarbiyah with a moderate religious orientation (*wasatiyah*) have social capital that is persistent towards democracy, while HTI and FPI and to lesser extent GMIM with a fundamentalist religious style (*usuliyyah*) have social capital that is resistant to democracy; (4) Muhammadiyah and NU see the context as friendly to sharia and do not aspire formalization of the sharia, while HTI and FPI see the context as unfriendly and aspire to the formalization of the sharia.

Figure 2: State-Faith-Inspired Civil Society Relations




Figure 3: Political and Religious Orientations of Faith-based Groups

Political Orientation	Radical	GMIM Neo-Salafi/Wahabi	Majelis Muiahidin Hizbut Tahrir Front Pembela Islam
	Conservative	Persis KWI Walu Muhammadiyah PGI PHD MUI	Nahdlatul Ulama BKSAU Buddha Dharma Perti
		Moderate	Reformist/ Radical
		Religious Orientation	

Conclusion

The general conclusion that one could draw upon, based on this study, is the way of understanding religious texts and context has generated different types of social capital, its articulation, and mobilization. Faith and state differentiation have also caused NU and Muhammadiyah's social capital to be stable and persistent within the context of democratization. Meanwhile, state-religion integration, advocated by HTI and FPI, and to a much lesser degree GMIM has caused the mobilization of their social capital to resist Pancasila democracy.

Finally, this study would like to put forward recommendations as follows: (1) To develop Pancasila's multicultural democracy, the religious teaching resources need to be interpreted intellectually, contextually, and inclusively while considering public interest (*kepentingan umum*) in mind. Through this approach, religious teachings could be made compatible with democracy; (2) The government should relentlessly develop social situations compatible with the ideal norms of good governance and include the special need for some social organizations to minimize or hinder radicalization among certain social organizations.

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