

INCREASING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND CAPACITY OF INDIGENOUS PAPUANS: ENCOURAGING ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

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Abstract

This paper delves into the potential of collaborative governance in addressing conflict resolution in Papua, focusing on the marginalized Indigenous Papuans (OAP) affected by shifting management policies. The conflict stems from historical injustices and capacity disparities between OAP and non-OAP. It aims to introduce collaborative governance, emphasizing reconciliation and adaptive approaches, particularly capacity building, and identifies potential implementation hurdles. Using normative research methodology with secondary data, the hypothesis proposes enhancing OAP capacity and participation to facilitate collaborative processes. Despite LPDP scholarships' ineffectiveness, a structured roadmap is essential for fostering collaborative governance. Furthermore, engaging the private sector is crucial, leveraging its information-seeking capabilities to enhance program efficacy. Collaboration with the private sector should align with OAP interests, aiding capacity building through education and training initiatives.

Keywords: Adaptive Collaborative Governance; Affirmations; Collaborative Governance; Papua Conflict; Indigenous Papuans

Abstrak

Paper ini menjelajahi potensi tata kelola kolaboratif dalam menyelesaikan konflik di Papua, dengan fokus pada Suku Asli Papua (OAP) yang terpinggirkan akibat perubahan kebijakan manajemen. Konflik berasal dari ketidakadilan sejarah dan disparitas kapasitas antara OAP dan non-OAP. Tujuannya adalah memperkenalkan tata kelola kolaboratif, dengan menekankan rekonsiliasi dan pendekatan adaptif, khususnya pembangunan kapasitas, serta mengidentifikasi hambatan implementasi potensial. Menggunakan metodologi penelitian normatif dengan data sekunder, hipotesis mengusulkan peningkatan kapasitas dan partisipasi OAP untuk memfasilitasi proses kolaboratif. Meskipun beasiswa LPDP tidak efektif, sebuah rencana jalan yang terstruktur penting

untuk memupuk tata kelola kolaboratif. Selain itu, melibatkan sektor swasta sangat penting, memanfaatkan kemampuannya dalam mencari informasi untuk meningkatkan efektivitas program. Kolaborasi dengan sektor swasta harus sejalan dengan kepentingan OAP, membantu pembangunan kapasitas melalui inisiatif pendidikan dan pelatihan.

Kata kunci: Rekonsiliasi Arab Saudi-Iran, Konstelasi Politik, BRI, Kepentingan China

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Introduction

The problem of separatist conflict in Papua is the longest separatist conflict in Indonesian history compared to the conflicts in Aceh and East Timor (Djo, 2020). The conflict began with the New York Agreement which decided to hand over Papua to Indonesia through the intermediary of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in 1963 (Mulia et al., 2020), followed by the Act of Free Choice in 1969 (Tebay, 2005). An attack by the separatist movement Free Papua Organization was first carried out on July 26, 1965, in Manokwari, which then in 1973 attacked Freeport's mining activities in 197 in Timika (Harianja, 2020). The motives of separatist movements are generally caused by a sense of injustice that arises due to the invasion or annexation of territory (Kingsbury & Laoutides, 2015). The Indonesian government in resolving the Papuan conflict in the pre-reform period tends to use a repressive approach (Suropati, 2019).

Separatist conflicts are still common in Papua. The recent exchange of fire between Indonesian National Army soldiers and Armed Criminal Groups in Gome District, Puncak Regency, Papua, killed 3 Indonesian National Army (Santoso, 2022). Previously, in May 2020 there was a shooting of medical personnel in Intan Jaya by an Armed Criminal Group that killed 2 medical personnel (Putra, 2020). From 2010 to 2020, there have been 204 cases of violence in Papua (Edi, 2020).

The persistence of the separatist conflict in Papua attracted the attention of the author. The existence of this fact gave rise to

the idea of an alternative resolution to the Papuan conflict. The idea came about by examining the efforts made by the Government of Indonesia in overcoming the Papua conflict. The issue was raised and reviewed using the concept of adaptive collaborative governance theory. This article outlines the provision of affirmations in the field of politics and education for OAP in realizing adaptive collaborative governance in Papua.

Theoretical Approach to Collaborative Governance and Adaptive Collaborative Governance

The concept of governance is increasingly recognized for its usefulness in encouraging the realization of welfare through the involvement of citizens (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). The collaborative governance approach has been applied to countries in Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea (Eldridge et al., 2018). Anglo-Saxon countries promote collaborative governance as part of good governance as they develop based on the values of a win-win situation for all parties involved (Anriani, 2022). The emergence of collaborative governance is associated with two factors, the existence of problems that are difficult to solve and the increasing complexity of public problems (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Collaborative governance applies to unavoidable flaws but healthy relatives politics is demonstrated by worthy respect for people's preferences (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011). The collaborative process in regional development is quite good because the collaboration has gone through a movement of common principles, motivating each other, and building common capacity (Ruswandi et al., 2021). Institutional capacity building through the implementation of collaborative governance is needed in overcoming obstacles in improving the regional economy (Mindarti & Sentanu, 2021).

Collaborative governance requires cooperation between governments, communities, and private institutions to solve problems (Iskandar, 2021). However, the term "collaboration" should not be confused with "cooperation" (Agranoff & McGuire,

2003). Collaborative governance is a strategy in the public domain that brings together stakeholders from various sectors to design and implement a policy (Sher-Hadar et al., 2021). Collaborative governance is an activity that is binding between related parties (Luh ni, 2019). In addition, collaborative governance as a collective and egalitarian process has equal opportunities and substantive authority by each of the participants and in the decision-making process (Bodin et al., 2016). Collaborative governance can be divided into three types of collaboration, collaboration among different types of government, among different social actors, and collaboration between humans and nature (Yang, 2015). The concept of collaborative governance requires collaboration between the government and non-government actors in the formation of a policy, while the concept of adaptive collaborative governance is a policy concept that can respond to changes in the surrounding environment.

Wildavsky argues that collaboration involves several different dimensions that are not necessarily consistent or complementary, but some can be mutually exclusive 1) collaboration can involve cooperation to build common ground, improve consistency, and harmonize activities between actors, 2) collaboration can be a negotiation process, which involves being prepared to compromise and make trade-offs, 3) collaboration may involve the role of supervision, checking, swearing and coordination of the center, 4) collaboration may involve force and coercion, the ability to impose results or impose one's preferences on others, to some extent, with their compliance or involvement, 5) collaboration may involve future commitments and intentions, prospective behaviors, planning or preparation to align activities, and 6) collaboration may involve engagement, development of internal motivation and personal commitment to projects, decisions, organizational goals or strategic goals (Wanna, 2008).

The second concept is adaptive collaborative governance which emphasizes two things, 1) an approach in which groups of

actors deliberately use social learning as a basis for decision making and 2) inclusion and equality in processes and outcomes, which seek to generate effective relationships among actors and/or groups of actors (C. McDougall & Banjade, 2015).

Overview of Action to Resolve the Papua Conflict

Papua's problems have existed since before Indonesia's independence. In 1957, the Dutch gave the promise of Papuan independence but it was never realized. This Dutch promise became the root of the problem with the emergence of the Free Papua Movement. In the Round Table Conference, the Netherlands did not recognize Papua as part of Indonesia. However, at the urging of the United Nations (UN) authorities in 1963, an act of free choice resulted in Papua becoming part of Indonesian territory.

In 1965, the Free Papua Movement (OPM) was formed, which is a resistance organization against the Indonesian government. This organization aims to end Indonesian rule in Papua and make Papua an independent state. The OPM then expanded and carried out various kinds of protests in the form of guerillas and formed the National Liberation Army-West Papua consisting of military forces with modern weapons. Along with the attention of the international community to humanitarian issues in Papua, a Peace Conference in West Papua was held to discuss problems in Papua. Since then, the struggle for Papuan independence has shifted from violent struggle to nonviolent struggle. However, OPM's physical attacks still occur today.

OPM or now known as the Armed Criminal Group carried out attacks on health centers and medical personnel's homes. As a result of this attack, one medical personnel on behalf of Gabriela Meilan found dead. The attacks carried out by the KKB provide a sense of concern in the community so that the community feels that their security is threatened.

The Indonesian government has made a series of efforts to resolve the conflict in Papua, both militarily and non-militarily.

However, these efforts have not been able to overcome the conflict in Papua. One of the non-military policies carried out by the Government of Indonesia is to grant special autonomy to the Provinces of Papua and West Papua. The philosophical aspects of the 2001 Papua Special Autonomy Law mandate that indigenous Papuans must have independence and physical and mental well-being both economically, politically, and socially.


In general, the granting of Papua's special autonomy is based on secession issues, separatist conflicts, and resource struggles. In the 2001 Papua Special Autonomy Law, it is stated that the reasons for granting autonomy are: (1) recognition of the customary rights of the Papuan people, (2) recognition of special regions, (3) special autonomy as a way of national integration, (4) recognition of the Papuan population who belong to the Melanesian race, (5) recognition of government errors in development policies in Papua, (6) inadequate management of natural resources, (7) reducing the gap between Papua Province and other provinces, (8) protection of the basic rights of indigenous Papuans, (9) demands the resolution of human rights issues, and (10) the desire to restore the name of Irian Jaya to Papua.

The implementation of special autonomy in Papua has also failed to resolve conflicts due to the high rate of corruption. In 2018 in Papua Province there were 8 corruption cases with a state loss value of 91.3 billion rupiahs (Alamsyah et al., 2018). Then in the 1st semester of 2020 in Papua Province, there were 4 corruption cases with a state loss value of 21.7 billion rupiahs (Alamsyah, 2020). Some quite eye-catching corruption cases are as follows: budget corruption of Depapre-Kemiri road by David Manibui, state losses of 42 billion rupiahs (Nurmasari & Al Hafis, 2019) and corruption of social assistance funds by Lakiyus Peyon in Yalimo Regency, state losses of 1 billion rupiahs (CNN Indonesia, 2021).

Based on data from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) shows that Papua Province is ranked 10th out of the

provinces with the most corruption cases from 2004 to 2020 as outlined in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Corruption Cases by Province in Indonesia, 2004-2020



Source: (Bayu, 2020).

The existence of these problems shows that the special autonomy policy approach has not been able to resolve conflicts in Papua. The special autonomy policy was rejected by many people in Papua because the special autonomy policy did not empower Indigenous Papuans (Mashuri & van Leeuwen, 2018). In addition, OAP still feels excluded and not prosperous. Data from the Central Statistics Agency show that in September 2020, Papua became the province with the highest poverty rate at 26.8% (Sembiring, 2021). This is exacerbated by the high rate of corruption in Papua, so, naturally, the conflict in Papua cannot be resolved.

Government Action in Collaborative Governance Promotes Reconciliation in Papua

The Indonesian government has acknowledged the government's mistakes in development policies in Papua and the

government's desire to provide equality between Papua and West Papua Provinces and other provinces. The emergence of the concept of collaborative governance is due to implementation failures, expensive costs, and the politicization of public regulations (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This is in line with the principle of collaborative governance conveyed by Zurba, the collaborative governance process will include actions in the form of truth disclosure, various forms of accountability, and compensation (Zurba, 2014). Compensation and reforms will be the main drivers affecting capacity and ongoing changes in the system of government (Zurba, 2014). The totality of these actions can in turn lead to institutional reforms, long-term development, and cross-culturally driven goals (Zurba, 2014). The changes will make community input more influential in the decision-making process and in turn, will serve as a balancing force that increases the capacity of communities to collaborate meaningfully in government (Zurba, 2014). To continue to be adaptive to empowerment and improve processes for previously oppressed populations (Zurba, 2014).

Nowadays, the international community has established a Declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) that puts pressure on previously colonized countries to recognize indigenous peoples' rights to sovereignty and decision-making power (Hays & Bieseke, 2011). The declaration provides comprehensively addresses the problems of indigenous peoples and governments (Hays & Bieseke, 2011). 15 of the 46 norms contained in the declaration relate to the ability of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making processes that ultimately affect their livelihoods (Zurba, 2014).

The implementation of UNDRIP poses many challenges stemming from differences and political, economic, legal, social, and cultural barriers whose forms vary greatly in each country (Hays & Bieseke, 2011). South Africa and Indonesia are the countries that support the declaration. Practices in South Africa

that have eliminated oppression and discrimination against people of color give rise to equality in all areas.

Governments must build structural equality by reconciliation and developing more meaningful working relationships (Zurba, 2014). The reconciliation process has been formally instituted in South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC) by establishing Law Number 34 of 1995 which mandates the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which is a forum for disclosing the truth, seeking reconciliation, and exposing gross human rights violations that occurred between 1960 and 1994 (Zurba, 2014).

Indonesia, especially in the case of Papua, has established the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP). MRP is a cultural representation of OAP that has certain authority in the context of protecting OAP rights, based on respect for customs and culture, women's empowerment, and strengthening religious harmony, which amounts to 1/3 of the total MRP members, each of which is 1/3 of the total MRP members (Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Papua, 2001). The establishment of the MRP was inspired by the existence of a Maori cultural institution in New Zealand that has fought for the Maori Society for protection from the state (Lay & Purwoko, 2018).

The law gives broad powers to the MRP such as the authority to give consideration and approval to potential candidates for governor and deputy governor proposed by the Papuan House of Representatives (DPRP) (McGibbon, 2004). The MRP can also give consideration and approval to prospective members of the MPR for the Papua Province regional envoy proposed by the DPRP and the Draft Special Regional Regulation (Perdatus) submitted by the DPRP and the Governor (Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Papua, 2001). However, later the regional envoy was abolished and replaced by the Regional Representative Council

(DPD) along with changes in the composition of the MPR membership.

The presence of the MRP can be said to be a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (KKR) because of its authority to handle the alignment of Papua's history (McGibbon, 2004). The Indonesian government realizes that starting the implementation of collaborative governance requires recognition of previous mistakes. This is also confirmed in the consideration of Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province.

Unlike the presence of the TRC in South Africa and the Maori Cultural Institutions in New Zealand, the presence of the MRP has not taken an important role in representing indigenous Papuans and has failed to assert its legitimacy in contestation with other legislative institutions such as the DPRP, DPRK, churches, and other indigenous institutions (Lay & Purwoko, 2018). Bertrand argues that this can be attributed to three factors, namely 1) the MRP which is part of special autonomy emerged not from negotiations but forced enforcement by the central government, 2) the Papuan people have been fragmented and failed to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the policy, and 3) the central government has failed to ensure its credibility and leadership to prevent separatism (Lay & Purwoko, 2018). The establishment of MRP and KKR can be considered collaborative governance strategies because the theory presented by Zurba is related to the process of truth-telling and reform (Zurba, 2014). The existence of KKR, which is an institution that reveals the truths of the past and provides compensation, will affect changes in community participation in collaborative policy formation (Zurba, 2014). The same thing is true with the existence of MRP, MRP can be a forum for OAP to participate in policy formation collaboration.

OAP Capacity Building Towards Adaptive Collaborative Governance

Adaptive collaborative governance is an approach that explicitly connects learning (experiential and experimental) and

collaboration to facilitate effective governance (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). Social learning in such contexts is defined as the process by which many stakeholders bring together their different knowledge, experiences, perspectives, values, and capacities for a process of communication and critical reflection as a means of jointly understanding and addressing common problems, challenges, and potential choices (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013).

Nepal is one of the countries that has successfully implemented the principle of adaptive collaborative governance by increasing the capacity of marginalized groups in forest management (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). Such capacity building is based on the fact that there is a capacity gap referring to the lack of general skills (such as communicating effectively in diverse groups) and specific skills or knowledge (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). Indonesia has tried to increase the capacity of OAP by providing higher education affirmations.

Higher education affirmation policies are urgently needed to realize collaborative governance. Capacity building is needed for collaborative governance and problem-solving (Sirianni, 2010). In the context of conflict resolution in Papua, the Indonesian government has made efforts to encourage collaborative governance through capacity building in the form of a special scholarship scheme provided to OAP. Although it is not specifically only given to OAP, OAP is one of the target recipients of the scholarship. The scholarships are higher education scholarships for master and doctoral degrees. The scholarship is given by the Government of Indonesia through the Ministry of Finance in this case LPDP.

The number of scholarship recipients from 2013-2020 under the scheme awarded to OAP either specifically or not is shown in Table 1. The data is then reclassified based on the province of origin of the scholarship recipient so that the exact number of OAP recipients of the LPDP scholarship can be known.

Table 1. LPDP Scholarship Recipients, 2013-2020

Scholarship Program	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Affirmation Scholarship	26	672	949	1.174	400	911	1.828	5.634
East Indonesia Scholarships	-	-	-	-	102	-	230	332
Affirmation District Scholarship	-	-	-	-	-	-	283	1.635

Source: (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021).

Through the higher education affirmation program, it is hoped that OAP will have a capacity equivalent to human resources in other provinces. The increase in capacity also shows that the Government of Indonesia is pursuing the concept of adaptive collaborative governance. The capacity building will improve the collaboration process. OAP no longer feels marginalized and its basic rights have been fulfilled by the Government of Indonesia.

From 2013 to December 31, 2020, there were 287 indigenous people of Papua Province and 139 indigenous people of West Papua Province who received LPDP Scholarships (Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan, 2021). The LPDP program can be said to be part of the adaptive collaborative governance process, the Government of Indonesia seeks to increase the capacity of OAP to collaborate in solving the Papuan problem, although this policy tends to be top-down. It is undeniable that the OAP affirmation policy is a top-down policy, but this policy is an effort made by the government and this policy encourages the creation of collaborative governance in Papua. For this policy to be not only top-down, but it also requires OAP participation to participate in this policy. The form of participating in OAP in this policy is to provide input to LPDP regarding the criteria for the target scholarship recipients. In addition, another role to realize collaborative governance in this policy is that the private sector participates in scholarship financing, which can be done through a scholarship financing cooperation scheme for OAP.

The Indonesian Government's efforts in collaborative governance in conflict resolution in Papua are shown by providing an opportunity for OAP to participate in the decision-making process with the existence of representative institutional reforms in Papua. Brancati argues that giving authority to threatened or embattled minority groups to control their social, economic, and political affairs, could potentially reduce conflicts (Lele, 2021). In addition, the Government of Indonesia has also tried to increase the capacity of the community to collaborate meaningfully in government by providing higher education scholarships for OAP. These measures have shown that the Government is changing the pattern of approach in conflict resolution from using violence to a nonviolent approach with collaborative governance mechanisms as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Comparison of Papuan Conflict Resolution Approaches

Element	Before Special Autonomy (Papua Special Autonomy Act 2001)	After Special Autonomy (Papua Special Autonomy Act 2001)	Papua Special Autonomy Act 2008	Papua Special Autonomy Law 2021
Pendekata n	Repressive	Persuasive	Persuasive	Persuasive
Decision-making mechanism	Decision-making is centralistic because during the new order era, Indonesia adhered to a centralistic system	Decision-making tends to be collaborative, indicated by the mechanism for proposing Papua Province to the Central Government on the formation, expansion, elimination, and/or merger of Regencies/Cities (Article 3 paragraph (4)). In addition, international agreements made by the Central	The decision-making mechanism in this Act has not changed and is still collaborative .	The decision-making mechanism in this Act has not changed and is still collaborative .

		Government that are only related to the interests of Papua Province are implemented after receiving the consideration of the Governor of Papua (Article 4 paragraph (6)).		
The decision is made by	Central Government	It is collaborative except for matters of authority in the fields of foreign policy, security defense, monetary and fiscal, religious, and judicial as well as certain authorities in other fields established in accordance with laws and regulations (Article 4 paragraph (1)).	This Act does not change the subjects who are decision makers and still retains the provisions of the Special Autonomy Act 2001.	This Act does not change the subjects who are decision makers and still retains the provisions of the Special Autonomy Act 2001.

Source: Papua Special Autonomy Law.

There is a change in the approach method taken by the Indonesian Government in resolving the conflict in Papua. In the pre-reform period, the Government of Indonesia tended to use a repressive and centralized approach in the decision-making process. This has changed with the existence of Law Number 21 of 2008 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province. The approach used by the Government of Indonesia tends to be persuasive and collaborative in the decision-making process. The existence of this fact strengthens the element of OAP participation and collaboration in the formation of policies regarding Papua by accommodating OAP in the seats.

The presence of these institutions has still not succeeded in resolving the conflict in Papua. In addition, OAP participation is

also sorely lacking. This is shown by the fact that the legislature in Papua is controlled by non-OAP people. During the period of the implementation of special autonomy 2001-2021, OAP representation in the legislature was very low, on average OAP only occupied legislative seats in Papua Province as much as 38% and West Papua as much as 36% (Sucahyo, 2021). In addition, at the district/city level, OAP participation in the legislative realm is uneven, there are districts/cities where the percentage of OAP as legislators is above 50%, but there are also districts/cities where the percentage of OAP as legislators is at 20% (Sucahyo, 2021). This problem is caused by the complexity of problems in Papua related to, for example, uneven Human Resources (HR). The government facilitates representative institutions if no one is qualified, in the end these institutions are filled only by elites. This means that the idea of collaborative governance requires prerequisites, or perhaps stages, to be equal and strong first the OAP capacity. It cannot be direct because of different local conditions.

Although the Government of Indonesia has provided affirmation programs to OAP to increase their capacity, the program has not been able to increase OAP participation in the legislative realm to support the implementation of the concept of collaborative governance. This is shown by the small percentage of OAP in the legislature even though there is already an LPDP affirmation scholarship. The small percentage of OAP in the legislative realm can have an impact on OAP increasingly feeling excluded which can trigger jealousy due to inequality and cause conflicts (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, 2019). The implementation of the principle of collaborative governance is hampered by the lack of OAP in the regional legislature. HR are limited to encourage the running of the collaborative governance process, so it can be said that not all contexts can be applied collaborative governance. The collaboration process becomes unbalanced and decision-making on policies concerning the authority of local governments is dominated by ideas and ideas from non-OAP.

Unlike Papua, the poor and women in Nepal have successfully demonstrated real collaboration in Community Forest User Group (CFUG) (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). Starting from those who are marginalized groups to become an influential group in decision making at CFUG (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). Increased engagement of women and the poor in CFUG in line with member satisfaction with engagement also increased (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). The increasing participation of women and the poor brings their voices to be one of the keys in decision making (C. L. McDougall et al., 2013). Looking at these facts, OAP should be able to show real collaboration in the DPRP. OAP participation in the DPRP must be increased so that their votes become one of the keys in decision-making in the DPRP.

The fact that OAP's low representation requires the Government of Indonesia to form a policy so that the participation rate of OAP in regional legislatures increases. The policy is in the form of political affirmations. The policy of political affirmation to OAP has been given by the Government of Indonesia. The author summarizes the forms of giving affirmations to OAP as outlined in Table 3.

Table 3. Affirmations for OAP in Papua

Element	Before Special Autonomy (Papua Special Autonomy Act 2001)	After Special Autonomy (Papua Special Autonomy Act 2001)	Papua Special Autonomy Act 2008	Papua Special Autonomy Law 2021
Types of Affirmation s	There is an institution of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) consisting of Members of the House of Representativ	Papua Province has envoys who sit as members of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia	This Act does not change the type of affirmatio n given to the OAP and still retains the	OAP can be directly appointed as legislative members, namely DPRP Members and Members of the Regency People's

es (DPR), regional envoys, and group envoys. There is no specific benchmark in filling in the regional envoys in the MPR, so the researchers stated this is not a form of affirmation given specifically to the OAP.	(MPR RI) elected by the Papuan People's Representative Council (DPRP) (Article 7 paragraph (1) letter l). The Governor and Deputy Governor shall be OAP (Article 11 subsection (3) letter a). There is a Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) consisting of OAP (Article 19 paragraph (1)).	existing provisions in the Special Autonomy Act 2001.	Representative Council (DPRK) without a general election mechanism, the number is as much as 1/4 times the number of DPRP / DPRK members
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Source: (Manan, 2003; Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Papua, 2001; Undang-Undang Nomor 35 Tahun 2008 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2008 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Papua Menjadi Undang-Undang, 2008; Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2021 Tentang Perubahan Kedua Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 Tentang Otonomi Khusus Bagi Provinsi Papua, 2021).

The existence of Law Number 2 of 2001 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua Province provides affirmation of the affirmation given to OAP to occupy legislative seats. Through efforts to provide affirmations to OAP to occupy legislative seats without a general election mechanism and the provision of special quotas for OAP as much as 1/4 of the total number of regional legislative seats shows that the Government of

Indonesia still wants to maintain participation in decision-making in exercising special autonomy in Papua.

In order to support the collaborative governance approach in conflict resolution in Papua, there are three elements that must be met, namely the Government of Indonesia, OAP, and the private sector. The private sector can be involved in policy formation in Papua. The involvement of the private sector in policy formation in Papua is because the private sector plays an important role in development in Papua. So far, there has been a PT. Freeport, however, its presence has tapered the conflict because of its presence that displaces the OAP. The concept of the role of the private sector in collaboration should coexist with OAP and collaborate with the Government to increase OAP capacity. The increase in OAP capacity can also be done by providing education and training to OAP. Governments must believe that the private sector has great access to information that can make programs more effective (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011). Through the collaboration process of each of these elements, the Papuan conflict has the potential to be resolved. The main key to such a collaboration process lies in the comparison of the quantity and capacity of each element must be balanced. The mechanism will pay attention to OAP. There is no longer a sense of marginalization and is not considered by the OAP because it is not involved in the policy-making process. In addition, the collaborative governance process can be realized after the Government of Indonesia thoroughly investigates the mishandling of Papua in the past through the Papua KKR.

Conclusion

The problem of the Papuan conflict still occurs today. Various approaches have been taken by the Government of Indonesia in resolving the Papua conflict. After the reform era, the Indonesian government tried to resolve the Papuan conflict with a policy of special autonomy. The collaboration process is carried out by the Government of Indonesia by establishing special power institutions at the regional level. However, the

collaboration process was hampered by the low participation of OAP in the legislature. The Government of Indonesia seeks to increase the capacity of OAP by providing affirmations for higher education. However, the affirmation program has not been able to increase OAP participation in the legislative realm. The Indonesian government provides political affirmations by allocating 1/4 of the regional legislative seats for OAP without going through an electoral mechanism to increase OAP participation in regional legislatures. Collaborative governance presupposes citizens are ready to be able to collaborate with the same level of leverage as the government. In the context of Papua, OAP still has a situation that needs to be strengthened first to encourage collaboration. The creation of representative institutions because of the uneven distribution of human resources between regions, makes it not effective enough to become a representative institution and be able to speak up on local issues. It is mostly juga inhabited by elites. LPDP scholarships have not yet benefited. That is, it needs to be a stage and road map to encourage collaborative governance. In addition, to improve the collaborative governance process, the Government of Indonesia must involve the private sector. The private sector has great potential in seeking information to support the effectiveness of the program. The concept of the role of the private sector in collaboration should coexist with OAP and collaborate with the Government to increase OAP capacity. The increase in OAP capacity can also be done by providing education and training to OAP.

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